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Children and creativity: A most (un)likely pair?   
 
Vlad Petre Glăveanu 
London School of Economics 
 
This article addresses the question of whether children are or are not creative by exploring 
the assumptions underlying each possible answer. It is argued that our position regarding 
children’s creativity steams from larger systems of representation concerning children on 
the one hand, and creativity on the other. Arguments for and against the idea that 
children can be creative are then considered from four different perspectives: the product, 
process, person and press factor. On the whole, children’s creativity is accounted for in 
terms of a particular ‘reading’ of children as active and interactive beings and of creativity 
as a social and cultural phenomenon. In contrast, children’s lack of creative expression is 
linked with a passive and receptive image of the child and with theorising creativity 
through the lenses of the genius and of great creations. In the end, the benefits of 
acknowledging children’s creativity are considered for child and developmental 
psychology, for creativity research and for educational practices.    
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“Electricity is not only present in a magnificent thunderstorm and 
dazzling lightning, but also in a lamp; so also, creativity exists not 
only where it creates great historical works, but also everywhere 
human imagination combines, changes, and creates anything 
new” (Vygotsky, 1930/1967, cited in Smolucha, 1992, p. 54) 
 
 
 
It could come as a surprise maybe for some that the connection between children and 
creativity can end in a question mark. Children play, sing, dance, draw, tell stories and 
make up riddles in such a natural, spontaneous and creative way that it goes without 
saying that there is such a thing as ‘children’s creativity’. In fact, some would argue, 
children are the mere embodiment of human creativity. In a recent survey of 
laypeople’s representations of creativity (Author, under review), respondents were 
asked to rate and comment on different symbols that can potentially represent the 
essence of being creative. Findings revealed that ‘children’s drawings’ for example 
was found by most participants to be a good or very good creativity symbol. A variety 
of reasons were offered for why this was the case, and among them the idea 
repeatedly came up that “the child within all of us is the part which longs to create 
and come up with answers to all things”. In the collective imaginary (of people from 
the Western world and our present day at least) there seems to be a strongly held 
conviction that children are much more free and creative in their expression than 
adults. This theme has been well reflected in psychology too, in the work of several 
distinguished authors. Freud (1908/1970) himself compared the playing child with the 
creative writer. And yet, these kinds of understandings need to be historically situated. 
As Gardner (1982) rightfully pointed out, in centuries past, the association between 
children and art would have been easily dismissed. For it is “our romantic tradition, 
remolded in terms of a modernist ethos, [that] has made us responsive to the notion of 
the child as artist, and the child in every artist” (Gardner, 1982, p. 92). Can this tradition 
be said to mould contemporary psychology as well? 
 
The proper answer here would be ‘yes and no’. Yes if we look at today’s growing 
literature dedicated to measuring the ‘creative potential’ of children, its ups and 
downs through different developmental stages, the practical ways in which it could be 
enhanced, etc. At a theoretical level though there is considerable scepticism whether 
creativity, as defined by modern science, can be applied to children and the reasons 
for this are not altogether dismissible. To continue with Gardner’s (1982, p. 142) analysis 
of the child and her art, he cautiously remarked that experimental evidence does not 
support the “easy assumption that the young child is an artist”. Feldman, another 
acclaimed developmentalist and creativity researcher, warned at some point (in 
Sawyer et al., 2003, p. 219) about the tendency to ‘romanticise childhood’ by 
exaggerating the creative value of children’s products. Equally reserved, Duke stated 
that children ‘art’ can’t be called creative; it is “the first step of a creative process, but 
few children go beyond this first step in a journey that may demand 10 or 100 steps” 
(Duke, 1973, p. 8). What transpires here is the way in which a common-sense truism can 
trouble psychologists. The taken-for-grantedness of children’s creativity doesn’t seem to 
hold its ground when scientific definitions and methods are trying to unpack it. In the 
end, it is questionable whether children can live up to, little less embody, the traditional 
idealised image of what it means to be ‘truly’ creative. 
 
The notion of creativity in both science and common-sense thinking draws on a 
powerful legacy of the ‘genius’ or the ‘Great Creator’. The history of this concept is 
ridden by dichotomies between creative and uncreative, extraordinary and ordinary, 
exceptional and banal, art or science and everyday life, art and craft, and so on. 
There are strong ideological barriers safeguarding the realm of creativity against those 
who are deemed unable of ‘true’ creative expression. Among these we generally find 
all animals, the mad, and children. As Feldhusen (2002, p. 179) notes, “creativity is a 
phenomenon that is most often and successfully researched and understood at its high 
level, less frequently as exhibited by average people and/or children”. At best, children 
can be given a secondary role, at the periphery of creative expression, and be 
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acknowledged for their “low-range creativity” (Feldman in Sawyer et al., 2003, p. 219). 
This is furthermore suggested by distinctions such as those between ‘mature’ and 
‘mundane’ creativity (see Cohen and Ambrose, 1999, p. 9). The first type is the most 
valuable, leading to the transformation of a field and, as its name implies, it is reserved 
for adulthood. The second, also named ‘creativity in the small’, brings about the new 
at an individual, not societal level. Under these conditions, it is hardly surprising how a 
debate between scholars about the impact of society on children’s natural creativity 
ended with the following conclusion:  
 
“We came to a consensus that children are not really creative, given the 
definitions of creativity that are necessary to explain the important and influential 
innovations that have impacted our lives. Some of us are willing to retain a 
residual notion of small c creativity – the everyday cleverness that makes us smile 
or makes life easier – for the novel, unusual actions of children, but we all 
distinguish this from big C Creativity, the creation of culture-transforming 
products that is found only in adults” (Sawyer in Sawyer et al., 2003, p. 240). 
 
This article aims to challenge such a conclusion. It will do so not by engaging with 
particular pieces of empirical data or by claiming the falseness of separating children 
and creativity. On the contrary, this view will be considered as legitimate in its own 
right. What the present paper will examine are the epistemological reasons for 
supporting and/or contesting children’s creativity, considering them as symptomatic of 
deep-seated assumptions concerning children and creativity. From a constructionist 
standpoint, both sides of the debate are equally ‘valid’ in their efforts to convince us of 
a certain ‘reality’. Nevertheless, they have important practical consequences (for 
theory, for research, for education, etc.) and as such cannot and should not be 
equally supported. Some will undoubtedly be outraged by the perspective of 
considering the ‘constructed’ nature of our science, be it developmental or creativity 
psychology, and of raising (or perhaps lowering) the discussion from the level of facts to 
that of narratives about facts. To those I respond with Jerome Bruner’s reflection that 
“any story we tell about human infancy grows as much out of ideological convictions 
and cultural beliefs as out of observation” (Bruner, 1986, p. 134). There is great value in 
scrutinising these ideological convictions and cultural beliefs since, in our case, the 
‘stories’ we tell about children’s creativity are born out of ‘stories’ we tell about children 
and about creativity in themselves. As such, the presentation will start with a brief 
consideration of these ‘background narratives’. Following this, a review of arguments 
for why children are (or are not) creative will be offered, paying particular attention to 
how this debate both steams from and informs contemporary shifts in developmental 
psychology and creativity research. Finally, and in light of this analysis, the case will be 
made for why we should ‘bet’ on children’s creativity as the more fertile starting point 
for a contemporary perspective on children, creativity, and education.       
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1. Making sense of children and childhood   
 
Usually one thinks of making sense as something we engage in when we are 
confronted with an alien and mysterious reality. This description applies to a great 
extent to our efforts to know the human child, despite the fact that we all were one to 
begin with. Beautifully capturing this paradox, Kennedy (2008, p. 1) writes: “Childhood is 
both the most deeply familiar moment of the human life cycle and the great 
unknown”. The fact that we were once children, but we are not anymore, doesn’t 
make much easier the task of comprehending childhood as it is. Our knowledge of it 
will always be bound to our position in the world in relation to it, as adults. The 
adultcentrism of our theories is a characteristic that is here to stay and something we 
can’t correct but should more consistently acknowledge. The child is, in the end, 
simultaneously a historical, cultural, political, economic, social, and scientific 
production (Denzin, 1977). Definitions of childhood, as Burman (1994) observes, are 
always relational in nature, making reference to parents, families, the State, etc. 
Moreover, they are never inconsequential for how we come to define ourselves as non-
children. As Burman (1994, p. 48) continues to argue, “discourses of childhood (…) are 
part of the cultural narratives that define who we are, why we are the way we are and 
where we are going”. 
 
Unsurprisingly, childhood as a “social invention” (Valentine, 2004, p. 2) has a history, one 
that is more recent than what we commonly believe. In his seminal work on historical 
representations of children and childhood, Ariès (1962) demonstrated that this 
particular age was ‘absent’ as a concept in the Middle Ages and only started 
emerging in the upper classes in the 16th and 17th centuries. Of course children existed 
before that time but they were not seen as such, but rather like miniature adults. And 
even after they finally ‘materialised’, children went through a series of different 
‘incarnations’ before becoming the complex beings they are (considered) today. From 
the innocent and pure creature of the 17th century, to the emblematic sign of 
Romanticism in late 18th century, and up to the instinctual and sexual organism of 20th 
century psychoanalysis, the child transformed in unison with the social, cultural and 
political worldviews of the time. As David Kennedy (2006, p. 5) concludes: “Caught 
between divinity and animality, between what is and what it might be, it is the child 
who mediates the human possibility”. Indeed, children represent a space of possibility, 
a space of projection and constant re-presentation for all adult ‘outsiders’. 
 
What is projected onto the child is not always positive though. As a matter of fact, 
there is a pervasive tendency, arguably across historical times and geographical 
places, to define children in negative terms: not by what they are and have, but by 
what they are not and don’t have yet (Alanen, 1990, p. 16). And there are many things 
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adults (psychologists included) consider the child not to have. Analysing dominant 
conceptions, Vygotsky (1987, p. 53) made the same observation, pointing to how 
research is absorbed by an ethos of finding the “flaws, inadequacies, and limitations” 
of the child’s thinking, rather than her capabilities. In the words of D’Alessio (1990, p. 
70), “the idea of the unfinishedness of the child has long provided the basis for theories 
of child development”. This conception stands at the basis of what can be called a 
‘deficit model’ (see Shaw, 1996) of the child, one portraying children as less able, less 
developed and less experienced. Obviously, this calls for a comparison term and the 
comparison term is always the adult. Prout and James (1997) explored the roots of this 
general dichotomy and its associated symbolism. What this revealed is a general 
opposition between children as ‘nature’, ‘simple’, ‘amoral’, ‘asocial’ and ‘person-in-
waiting’ and adults as ‘culture’, ‘complex’, ‘moral’, ‘social’, and ‘personhood’; in other 
words, a dichotomy between children’s ‘becoming’ and adult’s ‘being’. 
 
And yet, psychology has come a long way in how it conceptualises children and 
childhood as a stage of development. From a traditional image of the passive and 
responsive child, especially at very low ages, theory has gradually moved to a 
depiction of the “informationally active, socially interactive infant mind” (Bruner, 1999, 
p. 230). A regained appreciation for the child’s capacity to understand and 
manipulate the world, to act both towards the self and others, and generally to go 
beyond the ‘here and now’ of experience, was prompted by current investigations of 
the symbolic function and its genesis. This is not a new interest but one that remained 
dormant under decades of behaviourism. The focus on the symbolic function is by no 
means irrelevant for our discussion of children’s creativity. In fact, the story of ‘creativity’ 
is largely considered to begin with the first symbolically mediated actions of the child:      
 
“Unlike other animals and unlike the infant during the first year of life, the child of 
two has clearly entered the realm of symbolic activity. (...) He may eat 
symbolically, using pretense gestures and pretend food. Moreover, such 
symbolic enactments are carried out seemingly for the sheer enjoyment of 
representational activity. There is no ulterior motive – unless one wants to count 
increased knowledge of the world and more effective communication about it. 
Needless to stress, this achievement of symbolic activity is enormous – in a sense, 
the greatest imaginative leap of all. Upon it will be constructed all subsequent 
forms of play, including play of literary imagination” (Gardner, 1982, p. 170).   
 
In conclusion, our historical and societal relationship to the ‘child’ – transcending the 
specifics of our interactions with particular children – was and continues to be marked 
by ambivalence (see Sommerville, 1982, p. 288). Children are, it seems, innocent, 
vulnerable and lovable, but they can also be disrupting, menacing and unpredictable 
(Burman, 1994; Valentine, 2004). As such, they require education, protection and a 
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watchful surveillance on the part of the adult. A similar ambivalence can be said to 
describe our understanding of children’s creativity. Whether children are indeed 
creative or not, whether being creative is good or not for them, it is hard to evaluate 
without uncovering the second piece of the puzzle: the meaning of creativity.       
 
2. Making sense of creators and creativity   
 
Creativity can be regarded as anther ‘great unknown’ for both scientists and 
laypeople. Explaining how novelty comes about is perhaps one of the most 
challenging tasks psychologists are facing, and this is even more so if this novelty is 
generated by children. Despite all the potential interpretations one can give to the 
terms ‘creative’ and ‘creativity’, there is today a surprisingly high consensus in the 
literature that creative products are new and “accepted as tenable or useful or 
satisfying by a group in some point in time” (Stein, 1953, p. 311). It is also what Wegerif 
(2010, p. 51) referred to as ‘creativity 1’, the playfulness of coming up with new ideas, 
and ‘creativity 2’, focused on creating something of value. This double criterion of 
originality and value constitutes the core of a scientific approach to creativity but it is 
important not to forget that, behind its relative simplicity, one can find a complex 
history of thinking about creation, from Antiquity onwards (see Sternberg and Lubart, 
1999). Of course, the term ‘creativity’ itself has been with us for a considerably shorter 
period of time and has gained widespread usage only in the 20th century. Similarly, the 
enthusiasm for what it means can be said to have emerge fully, in the Western society 
at least, after the half of the last century (see Weiner, 2000).  
 
It is hard to summarise centuries of thought on creativity and this will not even be 
attempted here. What needs to be highlighted though is the fact that explanations for 
both the capacity to generate novelty and the appreciation for it varied according to 
historical times, reflecting the main concerns and conceptions of the day. If in pre-
Renaissance the notion of creation was associated strictly with God and creative work 
was linked to divine inspiration, the ages that followed started forging a deep 
connection between creativity and genetic inheritance (Dacey, 1999, p. 310). Two 
broad models of creativity gradually emerged, supported by the zeitgeist of 
Romanticism and, respectively, the Enlightenment (see also Liep, 2001). The artist and 
the scientist, the two classical faces of the ‘creator’, have shaped and continue to 
shape our collective imaginary of what it means to be a creative person. Importantly 
for our argument here, the modern admiration for art and science as high forms of 
human achievement has largely been built on a separation between them and the 
processes of everyday living (see Dewey, 1934, for a discussion about art). Children’s 
creative expression, an intrinsic part of the latter, also pales in comparison to the 
breakthroughs of acclaimed artists and prolific scientists. 
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This leads us to the conclusion that there are many possible ‘readings’ of creativity and 
they can be found equally in scientific and popular discourses. The most prominent of 
these, spread across historical times up to the present day, steams from an association 
between creativity and genius. The towering figure of the genius, with its overtones of 
“individuality, insight, outstanding ability and, in particular, fertility” (Mason, 2003, p.111), 
largely contributed to the rupture mentioned above between ‘creating’ and ‘living’. 
Geniuses are rare, they are special, they stand apart from society and their role is to 
revolutionise it, to radically change our perspective of the world, usually for the better. 
The vast majority of us (children included in their totality), cannot aspire to this. 
Nevertheless, the paradigm of the genius did not remain unchallenged. The 
psychology of the 1950s contributed greatly to imposing a new perspective on 
creativity, one in which each and every individual is creative (albeit to different 
degrees) and this capacity we are born with can and should be educated. Under this 
vision children gained their ‘right’ to creativity, however modest its expression might be. 
Still, the mainstream psychological theory of creativity, for as progressive as it seems 
compared to the claustrophobic vision of the genius, on the whole failed to 
acknowledge the social and cultural embeddedness of creative work. Creativity does 
not spur from nowhere (as in the case of the genius), or from the individual alone (as 
cognitive models propose), but exists in between self and others, creator and 
audience, individual and community. The We-paradigm of creativity (see Glăveanu, 
2010a), gaining momentum in contemporary debates, considers creativity a 
collaborative and intersubjective enterprise.  
 
To summarise, creativity is a second term enjoying a very rich legacy of meanings and 
interpretations. The most pervasive of them until now has been the genius approach, a 
‘romantic model’ (Sefton-Green, 2000, p. 220) rooted in the exceptional creative 
powers of the (male and adult) creator. More ‘cultural’ readings of creativity, on the 
other hand, strive to reconnect it with the processes of everyday community life. The 
notion of children’s creativity is just one of the many points of fracture between these 
two approaches. To understand better the arguments of both sides we need to have a 
closer and more systematic look at what qualifies children as creative, or uncreative.  
                
3. The creative child? Junctions and disjunctions    
 
To organise our inquiry into if and why children can be considered creative, the 
following discussion will be built around the ‘canonical’ four Ps of creativity theory and 
research: Product, Process, Person and Press (or ‘pressure’; the environment, mostly 
social but not exclusively). Originally established by Rhodes (1961/1987), this framework 
and its categories are widespread and have the advantage of structuring a rather 
multifaceted phenomenon. On the downside, as Barron (1995, p. 32) noticed, a strict 
separation between product, process and person can only be an oversimplification, 
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since in reality the three stand as interconnected in every creative activity. For the 
purposes of our analysis though, this particular segmentation helps accentuate two 
contrasting notions of children and creativity and their immediate implications.       
 
3.1. The product perspective  
 
As previously noticed, our contemporary psychology of creativity is founded on the 
study of creative products. This focus on products is justifiable from a scientific 
perspective: products – like paintings, inventions, mathematical demonstrations, 
designer objects, and so on – are readily available for evaluation, even measurement. 
Their originality is there to be observed and judged and their value becomes apparent 
when products are incorporated in current social practices. ‘Creative’ products are 
original in the sense that there is a distance between them and what (we know) existed 
before them. They have an air of spontaneity, novelty, and generate surprise and 
curiosity in their viewers. From this perspective at least, children’s productions can be 
catalogued as creative. The way young children depict the world, especially at a pre-
school age, is a constant source of amazement and delight for parents and teachers, 
for adults as a whole. Their ‘freshness’ of perspective, their ‘boldness’ in breaking with 
realism and ‘easiness’ to disregard social conventions makes children’s drawings, for 
example, a perfect illustration of what ‘creativity’ really is. It is no wonder then that the 
great Pablo Picasso allegedly said "It took me four years to paint like Raphael, but a 
lifetime to paint like a child". Modern art, in its present form, greatly embraces child-like 
playfulness and experimentation. 
 
And yet we have virtually no child artists, in the sense Picasso was. Children may draw 
and paint and tell stories but their drawings and stories, enmeshed in the flow of 
everyday life, are easily lost and have no particular value for society. At best, children 
come to ‘re-invent’ things or ideas we already have and know. Except for the micro-
universe of the child and her family, children’s expression is worthless at a historical 
scale. And the historical scale is, as we well remember form before, one crucial point of 
focus for ‘romantic’ or ‘genius’ readings of creativity (Stein, 1953, p. 311). Even when 
‘child geniuses’ are discovered, as examples of extreme giftedness, their present works 
are appreciated in anticipation of future greater achievement, presumably reserved 
for when they become adults (prophecies that are seldom turned into reality...). On the 
whole though, much of what ‘ordinary children’ do and say is never really captured in 
the form of tangible products and, even when this is the case, it is rarely that these 
products survive the day.     
 
This raises a very interesting point of reflection for creativity researchers. If we restrict 
creativity to products we are bound to miss out on much of what creativity is or can be. 
Not only is the case that creativity commonly manifests itself as a process, but also that 
 
8
attempts at inferring the creative process from product alone are bound to be as 
successful as trying to turn fossils into living and breathing creatures. The ‘product bias’ 
(Runco, 2007, p. 384) needs to be more consistently addressed and there are signs of 
clear dissatisfaction with it. Researchers such as Keith Sawyer (2000) have been 
pointing for several years to the importance of performance and improvisation. This line 
of inquiry would presumably be much more fertile for recognising and understanding 
children’s creativity and not only. In the words of Sawyer:  
 
“Because performance, particularly in the more improvisational genres, is 
ephemeral and does not generate any lasting ostensible product, it has been 
easy to neglect. Even though performance has rarely been a subject for 
creativity research, it may actually represent a more common, more accessible 
form of creativity than privileged domains such as the arts and sciences. If one 
recognizes that all social interactions display improvisational elements, then 
everyday activities such as conversations also become relevant to creativity 
theory” (Sawyer, 1997, p. 2). 
 
3.2. The process perspective  
 
In the previous section it was suggested that a process rather than a product 
orientation would be much more adequate for our understanding of creativity, 
including the creativity of children and ordinary people. And yet, upon closer scrutiny, 
how sure are we that children’s internal and external processes and activities can be 
catalogued as ‘creative’? On the surface at least there seem to be clear parallels 
between the child’s play and the creator’s work. Gardner (1982, p. 90), for instance, 
pointed to several reasons why child and artist belong to the same category. On the 
one had the enjoyment of the task is obvious in both cases, and also a willingness to 
disregard common conventions. Also, both children and artists, as well as creators at 
large, employ a series of means allowing them to comprehend and express ideas and 
emotions. Engel (1993) advocated for a similar position referring to the expressiveness of 
children’s play and the experiential aspect of being creative. The discovery of the fact 
that blue and yellow make up green is accompanied by the same intense emotions 
that adult creators have in their famous Eureka moments. And yet, many of these 
points, as the authors who formulate them acknowledge, are open to contestation. 
Does a child’s enjoyment come from the real awareness of what she has created? 
Does her apparent disregard of norms and traditions reflect any knowledge of what this 
means? Is the experience of invention understood the same? 
 
All of these questions point to one major aspect that seems to characterise the adult’s 
creative process but not the child’s, and that is intentionality. In the general literature 
on creativity this aspect, implying goal-direct and conscious action, is gaining more 
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and more interest. Creativity, many claim, needs to integrate the intentional aspect 
otherwise we would be left with considering dreams or accidents as creative, which 
sounds unacceptable. As Weisberg (1993, p. 243) clearly states, “novelty brought about 
by accident would not qualify as creative, no matter how valuable the outcome”. He 
emphasises this point to the extent of proposing that ‘goal-directed novelty’ should be 
integrated in our conventional definition of creativity. This is also supported by authors 
like Gruber and Wallace (1999, p. 94), who see a complete definition of creative 
products as adding purpose and duration to the traditional novelty and value criteria. 
The consequences for children’s creativity and not only seem clear enough. The 
“scribbling with crayon on paper of a monkey”, the “random banging on a piano of an 
infant” and “the free-associational ‘words-salads’ of the schizophrenic” are to be 
disregarded by creativity researchers (Weisberg, 1993, p. 243). Reviewing some 
critiques of the idea of children’s imaginative capacities, Gardner (1982) enumerates: 
lack of control, of deliberate intention and of the ability to select among alternatives. In 
conclusion: “from this point of view, children’s apparently imaginative activities are 
best written off as happy accidents” (Gardner, 1982, p. 169).    
  
Once again, on the surface, this association between intentionality and creativity 
seems legitimate but what it betrays is an implicit assumption that human beings are 
rational and goal-directed thinkers and creators. The myth of the ‘Great Creator’, 
embarked on a large-scale project to revolutionise science, art, and society, planning 
ahead and being all-knowing of the details and implications of his actions doesn’t 
actually pass the test of empirical evidence. As it turns out, creators are not fully aware 
at each and every moment of where their work is going and how it will turn out. The 
creative process is defined by moments of unconscious incubation, by accidents and 
discoveries, by losing and finding one’s way. Realising this is the case, authors like 
Weisberg are quick to add that accidental discoveries (like that of penicillin) are not 
creative but can become so if and when “the individual realizes that the accident 
could be plumbed further” (Weisberg, 1993, p. 243). What at a macro-level and in 
retrospect seems like a planned and conscious journey, at a micro-level looks like a 
continuous cycle of micro-discoveries, of uncertainties and re-evaluations. This state of 
affairs has been superbly captured by John Dewey in his proposition of seeing the 
(artist’s) creative work as a constant cycle of doings (acting on the world) and 
undergoings (taking in the reaction of the world). The creator does not create in a 
vacuum but in a physical and social environment and the creative process is 
intrinsically linked to this environment. Furthermore, instead of placing accidents at the 
periphery of creative action we should consider them, as Dewey encourages us, at the 
core of an authentic experience of being creative:      
 
“The unexpected turn, something which the artist himself does not definitely 
foresee, is a condition of the felicitous quality of a work of art; it saves it from 
 
10
being mechanical. It gives the spontaneity of the unpremeditated to what 
would otherwise be a fruit of calculation. The painter and poet like the scientific 
inquirer know the delights of discovery. Those who carry on their work as a 
demonstration of a preconceived thesis may have the joys of egotistic success 
but not that of fulfilment of an experience for its own sake. In the latter they learn 
by their work, as they proceed, to see and feel what had not been part of their 
original plan and purpose” (Dewey, 1934, pp. 144-145). 
  
There is mounting evidence today that the creative process is not taking place ‘in the 
mind’ of the person, according to her intentions and plans, but actually is being played 
out in interactions with a physical and social world. This conclusion is supported both by 
creators and scientists. Paul Klee (1930) for example, discussing the process of painting, 
concludes that the painter “knows a great deal, but he only knows it afterwards” (cited 
in Lynton, 1975, p. 49). From another standpoint, Bruner shrewdly remarks, “the road to 
banality is paved with creative intentions” (Bruner, 1962, p. 18). Adopting such a 
perspective on creativity, much more akin to a ‘cultural’ reading of it, encourages us to 
bring back to the table the notion of children’s creativity. Children, especially at lower 
ages, don’t plan and don’t intend very much. But at the same time, whatever they 
‘create’ (a drawing, a form, a story, etc.), they are very eager to infuse with meaning 
and different interpretations. The same drawing becomes the basis for multiple stories, 
the same construction the starting point of different games. The ‘happy accidents’ 
referred to earlier are indeed happy, prompting meaning-creation further and further.    
  
3.3. The person perspective  
 
Creativity as a strictly personal (or intrapersonal) affair has been criticised above, and 
yet what centuries of thinking about ‘creation’ and decades of creativity research 
have shown us is precisely the fact that creativity was (and still is to a large extent) 
considered an individual attribute. The person of the genius is responsible for ‘creating’ 
and, more recently, the personality or cognition of the individual are seen as the locus 
of creativity (Glăveanu, 2010a). When applied to children, the person definition is 
bound to run into a serious problem. As argued in section 1, children have by and large 
been historically considered not as ‘real’ but as future persons, as ‘becoming’ persons. 
As such, the personality or cognitive structures of the child are in permanent 
construction and transformation so how can we legitimately talk about a child’s stable 
creative traits? Nonetheless, some authors can and do. For example Dudek (1973, p. 6), 
was confident to argue that “what we call creativity in children would seem to fall 
under the definition of creativity as personality trait”. This attitude or trait was not called 
creativity (unsurprisingly given the controversy presented here) but expressiveness, a 
precursor of later creative achievement. Expressiveness stands for characteristics such 
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as spontaneity, openness, outgoingness and aliveness. It was of course noted that this 
quality of the child is not really stable, at least below the age of five (p. 15).      
 
What is it, again, that makes authors so reluctant to talk directly about the creativity of 
children? The person perspective adds to the process one in this regard. The lack of full 
self and others-awareness is pointed to when disregarding children’s expressive efforts. 
Children, it is considered, rarely reflect on themselves and little less on whether they are 
creative or artistic (Engel, 1993). How could they? And even when it’s granted to them 
the awareness of doing things differently than others, a lack of appreciation for what 
rules and conventions are is lamented (Gardner, 1982, p. 89). Related to this point, 
children as a person ‘in becoming’ lack a real knowledge base to support their 
‘creativity’. Several authors have noticed in the work of great creators “an extensive 
amount of time between their initial exposure to the field and production of their first 
significant work” (Weisberg, 1999, p. 227). This has been formalised by Gardner (1993) 
as the “10-year rule”. Applying this logic to children would mean that, if seriously 
starting to engage with a domain at the age of two, chances are that only after 12 
years of age a remarkable contribution would be made... Fortunately or unfortunately 
though, children are much less focused and determined than this, having to learn 
about the world in general, and not some obscure segment of it. The ‘Great Creation’ 
paradigm, in action, limits again the meaning of what constitutes creative work.  
 
In the end, the scientific community is gradually becoming disenchanted with the 
perspective of locating creativity in the person, in her personality traits or cognitive 
mechanisms. There are plenty of reasons for this. To begin with, measures of personality 
or cognition (like divergent thinking) did not demonstrate high predictive validity. This is 
most obvious in the case of children, whose creative ‘potential’ is constantly scrutinised 
with the hope of determining who will be the creators of tomorrow. However, measures 
of ‘expressiveness’, for example, are not predictive of future performance (Dudek, 
1973, p. 15). At a deeper level though, this dissatisfaction with intrapersonal 
explanations of creativity came as a result of acknowledging that creating is not an 
individual affair, but involves the individual in relation to society and culture. This aspect 
starts to be reflected in the ‘press’ factor discussed below.    
 
3.4. The press (social) perspective  
 
Before putting children’s creativity to the ‘test’ of this last factor, it is important to make 
a general note about it. For emphasising social influences on creativity, the ‘press’ 
factor might seem at the beginning quite in tone with a ‘cultural’ reading of creativity. 
This is and is not so because, beyond stating that the social and cultural matter when 
we talk about creativity, ‘cultural’ approaches also have a special way of 
understanding the social and the cultural. Mainstream psychology (including social, 
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developmental and creativity psychology) have often considered the social as an 
outside factor, influencing the thinking and behaviour of the individual, putting certain 
‘pressures’ (hence press) on them and directing them. Cultural psychology makes a 
point in considering society and culture as working from ‘within’ and not (only) from the 
‘outside’ of socialised individuals. Institutions and social structures exist on the ‘outside’, 
but the symbolic world they populate can only be developed ‘in’ and especially ‘in 
between’ persons. The relevance of this observation will become obvious as follows. 
 
Are children creative in relation to the social and the cultural world? They certainly 
belong to this world and make constant efforts to apprehend it and become part of it. 
These efforts, defining the developmental process, are in fact revealing the ‘creativity’ 
of adjusting to an outside space which is at times comfortable and familiar, at times 
scary and dangerous, but most of all overwhelming in its demanding complexity. And 
yet, many would argue that it is precisely because children don’t have anything to 
contribute to this ‘space’, that they cannot and should not be called creative. 
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1988) model of person – field – domain illustrates this point:   
 
“This is an epistemological issue; in my view, it is society that constitutes creativity; 
therefore you can’t say that a child has any creativity to be suppressed until a 
certain segment of society – the field – construes it as such. I don’t know what it 
means to say that children are creative or that they display creativity. Usually what 
people mean by these terms is that children often appear to adults to be original, 
imaginative, or nonconforming. One could just as well interpret such behavior as 
ignorance of rules, or inability to follow them. There is really no evidence that this 
relates to adult creativity, as we usually think of it – that is, as an original response 
that is socially valued and brought to fruition” (Csikszentmihalyi in Sawyer et al., 
2003, p. 220). 
 
Other authors agree with this position. Feldman remarks for example that it is true that 
“no child has ever added to a culturally valued body of knowledge” (in Sawyer et al., 
2003, p. 219). The issue of (social and cultural) value, touched upon in section 3.1., 
gains its true proportion when we consider it in light of social mechanisms. Consistent 
with his epistemology, Csikszentmihalyi is ready nevertheless to acknowledge the fact 
that children’s productions can be ‘valuable’ indeed for parents and teachers, but for 
as long as there is no constituted domain and field for them, they remain “peripheral to 
every culture” and, as such, “the creativity of such productions is not very relevant” 
(Csikszentmihalyi in Sawyer et al., 2003, p. 220). 
 
This particular vision brings us right back to the first observation regarding the two 
understandings of culture. On the one hand we have a structural, institutional, and 
highly formalised version of culture, adopted by Csikszentmihalyi and others. On the 
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other hand though, we can hold a vision of culture as a micro and macro 
phenomenon, dynamic and open to the ‘small creations’ that keep it alive and give it 
continuity. Culture as a set of symbolic and material artefacts, of norms and 
conventions, of types of knowledge and behaviours, doesn’t need to be embodied in 
a recognised field or domain to exist as such (see Glăveanu, 2010b; Willis, 1990). Culture 
exists and is produced between people as well, in families, in schools, on the streets, 
etc. Contributing to these (micro) cultures is no less significant than contributing to 
institutionalised domains such as the arts or sciences. Without all these contributions we 
would not be able to speak of culture or society. Great Creations are remarkable, but 
small, mundane ones, are very much significant in their own right. And it is this kind of 
significance that children’s ‘creative’ activity gains and generates. As Engel (1993) 
rightfully observes, the classroom context for example is a cultural system in itself, no less 
comparable to artists’ studios, scientists’ laboratories or inventors’ testing rooms.         
 
4. A practical ‘bet’ and its implications  
 
Our analysis of arguments for and against the idea of children’s creativity has revealed 
thus far a very complex picture. Indeed, there is no single uncontested criterion that 
can help us to delineate radically the creative from the uncreative. What is more, each 
criterion discussed above (originality, value, intentionality, etc.) is deeply and intricately 
connected to our general conceptions about children and creativity as such. In order 
to simplify things – although in this regard simplifications can be misleading – we can 
come to abstract two general directions in how we conceptualise children on the one 
hand, and creativity on the other. By and large, children are either depicted in our 
theories as passive and receptive, depending on the outside world and simply ‘taking 
in’ the influence of their environment, or as active and interactive, responding from an 
early age to the world around them and developing through interactions with others, 
where both child and other shape the course of the interaction. In the case of 
creativity the claim has been made for a distinction between romantic or ‘genius’ 
readings of the phenomenon, based on the image of the Great Creator and the 
revolutionary creation, and cultural and social readings, trying to bridge great creative 
achievements with the everyday productions of ‘ordinary’ people. In this simplified 
landscape, it becomes clear that persons (including scientists) who believe in the idea 
of a passive child and hold a genius vision of creativity, will most likely answer the 
question ‘are children creative?’ in a negative way. On the contrary, an active child 
and a cultural perspective on creativity may support a positive answer to the same 
question. Of course there are many more positions ‘in between’ and some people may 
agree with some arguments and not others. While my personal views incline towards 
the second type of answer, this article was not meant to be an exercise in discovering 
the ‘truth’ about children and creativity. Written from a constructionist perspective, the 
assumption I started with is that different readings or stories we tell about people, 
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objects and processes of the world, need to be understood in their own right. Neither 
one, in this case, is more ‘correct’ than the other simply because (and this has been 
the central piece of the argument) they are drawing from different interpretative 
frameworks. To simplify even further, if possible, they serve as two differently coloured 
pairs of glasses, and when using one we get to see the same object differently from 
when we use the other. 
 
Having said that, constructionism is not meant to be an ‘everything goes’ type of 
epistemology. Although different constructions of the world are possible, it doesn’t 
mean all are equally useful for acting in the world. With the risk of turning to pragmatism 
right towards the end, I will propose looking at children’s creativity in a way similar to 
Pascal’s wager about the existence of God (see 2008 edition). In a nutshell, his 
argument was that believing in the existence of God is bound to bring many 
advantages if the belief turns out to be correct while still being advantageous even 
when proven wrong. The alternative belief is detrimental in both cases. Applying this to 
our particular question, it can be phrased as: adopting a position favourable to seeing 
the child as active and creativity as incorporating ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ 
accomplishments turns out to have many more theoretical and practical benefits than 
the alternative. Let us briefly elaborate on these in three domains: child psychology, the 
psychology of creativity, and education.  
 
Child psychologists starting with the premise that children are indeed creative from an 
early age, in their own ways, supported by social interaction and using the means they 
have at their disposal, would probably focus more on how novelty is produced and the 
role it plays in the development of the child (see also Feldman, 1999, on creativity and 
developmental shifts). They would recognise the efforts made by children, from early 
on, to engage with the world around them, to adjust to it while at the same time trying 
to make it a more hospitable and secure place. Cultivating a vision where children’s 
agency is implied would make us look more carefully at moments of micro-interaction 
between children and their peers, families, teachers, etc. and how they are driven by 
the active and creative involvement of both parties. This particular line of research is 
starting to be explored more and more by authors who focus on the bidirectionality of 
parent-child relations (Lawrence and Valsiner, 2003; Kuczynski and Navara, 2006), on 
elaborating a dynamic theory of socialisation (Maccoby, 1992; Kuczynski and Parkin, 
2007), and an interpretative approach to development (Corsaro and Eder, 1990). All 
these elaborations are fundamentally challenging the notion of the child as passively 
modelled by parents and broader social systems. On the contrary, children “build in 
innovative ways on the structure of the culturally organized information that they 
experience in interaction with others and in their exploration of the man-made physical 
environment” (Valsiner, 1997, p. 176). A developmental psychology founded on this 
kind of ethos would bring the ‘creative’ expressions of the child to the forefront, 
 
15
studying them in the context of the life and experience of their ‘author’ and less by 
comparison to those of the adult. Children’s meanings associated with their creations 
would be valued, reducing the risk of adultcentric and restrictive interpretations. 
 
For creativity theory and research, accepting the existence of children’s creativity 
would have even more radical consequences, some of which have been captured in 
the sections above. Genius readings of creativity have been all too dominant in past 
and present literature on the topic, obscuring the fact that ‘creative’ expression should 
not be restricted to an individual or small group of individuals but be reconnected to 
the life of human communities. As Bateson (1999, p. 153) notes, denying everyday life 
creativity “deprives us of a range of models for the creative process”. The present 
article exposed some of the potentially beneficial consequences of reading creativity 
through cultural ‘lenses’: a more fluid process and performance based approach, a 
grounding of creative action in the social and material world, a recasting of culture as 
an emergent phenomenon. This would also encourage researchers to understand the 
mechanisms of ‘little c creativity’, a notion discussed by Anna Craft extensively in her 
work. As an attitude to life revolving around the “resourcefulness and agency of 
ordinary people” (Craft, 2001, p. 49), little c creativity is an expression of ‘possibility 
thinking’, in its turn founded on imagination, curiosity and play (Craft, 2002). But above 
all, what children’s creativity would mean for creativity research is operating with a 
broader, more comprehensive definition of creativity. ‘Ordinary’ creativity can and 
does have ‘extraordinary’ effects, and among them is the maintenance and constant 
re-generation of human culture. Furthermore, what this ‘extended definition’ does in 
the end is to reveal the false dichotomy between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ forms of 
creativity. These are not separated by a ‘gap’, and neither placed on a ‘continuum’, 
but the ‘higher’ is built upon the ‘lower’, without which it would not exist. Celebrated 
forms of creativity are spurring from the fertile ground of everyday, playful creation. It is 
what Wegerif (2010, p. 38) also hinted at when considering that: 
 
“(...) it is not possible to get creativity 2, socially valued products, without first 
having lots of creativity 1, the everyday creativity of playfully coming up with lots 
of new and different ideas, connections and ways of seeing things regardless of 
whether or not these are socially valuable”.  
 
Finally, when it comes to educational practices, it is quite obvious why recognising 
children’s creativity is better than the alternative: it manages to put it on the agenda of 
educators and encourages them to consider creative expression and foster all those 
behaviours and attitudes linked to it (Craft, 2005). Creativity has come to be 
considered one of the most valuable attributes a person could have, at least in today’s 
Western societies, if not at a global level (Manson, 2003), and this certainly lead to the 
universalisation of creativity in the contemporary world of education (Jeffrey and Craft, 
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2001). Thinking about ways in which this quality can be cultivated in children is bound 
to bring together (as it does) parents, teachers and scientists from a variety of 
disciplines. Believing in the existence of creativity in children will further help 
‘materialise’ it, by paying more attention to all instances with potential creative value. 
Csikszentmihalyi argued, as we have seen from above, that a domain such as 
‘children’s art’ is peripheral to our culture and so children’s creativity is a contradiction 
in terms. This positions us inside a vicious cycle where not legitimising creativity leads to 
not encouraging or even discovering it, which in turn explains the absence of more 
institutionalised forums to be concerned with it, and finally reinforces the attitude of 
ignoring it even as a possibility. It is plausible that, if more people consider children to 
be creative, there will be stronger societal level transformations to allow for the display 
and celebration of this form of creativity. However, encouraging creativity in 
educational settings is not without its own problems and dilemmas, both practical and 
theoretical, psychological and pedagogical. Craft (2005) highlighted several of these, 
from the assumption that creativity is universal in nature and always a ‘good thing’ in 
the classroom, to the more pragmatic relationship between knowledge, the curriculum 
and creativity. These are all issues that require deep consideration and creative 
thinking on the part of theorists and practitioners alike.   
 
5. Concluding thoughts   
 
This article has addressed the issue of children’s creativity and argued for considering 
children as active and creative beings, developing forms of creative expression in 
interaction with adults and through play and experimentation with cultural artefacts. 
The interrogation about children’s creativity is far from meaningless. In fact, Vygotsky 
himself stated that “one of the most important questions of child psychology and 
pedagogy is the question about creativity in children, its development and its 
significance for the general development of the child” (Vygotsky, 1930/1967, cited in 
Smolucha, 1992, p. 51). And yet, despite its importance, we know little about the 
formative conditions of creativity in children (Feldhusen, 2002, p. 182). This is arguably 
the result not only of the intricacy of the phenomenon (which, on its own, could very 
well explain the slow progress) but, importantly, also of our general conceptions about 
children and about creativity. Opting for an understanding of children as creative 
would potentially transform our theories about children and creativity, and also 
influence our educational practices. In itself though, this would be only the beginning 
for a new set of questions and research interests. At least two of great importance are: 
research methodologies for studying children’s creativity and the domain specificity or 
generality of children’s creative expression. Both areas are not ‘new’ in any way, yet 
much of the work done in these fields reflects some problematic assumptions. For 
example, testing children’s creativity often starts from the premise that creativity is an 
intrapersonal feature or that creative products can be rated by experts who have little 
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access to process-information. Also, when it comes to creativity and domains, 
adopting a cultural perspective would support specificity with more arguments such as 
the ‘local’ embededness of creative action and the dependence of the symbolic 
function on available systems of tools and signs. All these insights and many more 
would be lost though unless we become ready to entertain the idea that children and 
creativity form not only a likely but also a promising pair.    
 
Acknowledgments: This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research 
Council [grant 620 number ES/H/13199/1]. The author would also like to thank the 
editors for their comments and their support.   
 
References  
 
Alanen, L. (1990). Rethinking socialization, the family and childhood. Sociological 
Studies of Child Development, 3, pp. 13-28. 
Ariès, P. (1962). Centuries of childhood: A social history of family life, translation by R. 
Baldick. New York: Knopf. 
Barron, F. (1995). No rootless flower: An ecology of creativity. Cresskill: Hampton Press. 
Bateson, M.C. (1999). Ordinary creativity. In A. Montuori & R. Purser (Eds.), Social 
Creativity, vol I (pp. 153-171). Cresskill: Hampton Press. 
Bruner, J. (1962). On knowing: Essays for the left hand. Cambridge: Belknap Press. 
Bruner, J. (1986). Actual minds, possible worlds. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Bruner, J. (1999). Infancy and culture: A story. In Chaiklin, S., Hedegaard, M & Jensen, 
U.J. (Eds.), Activity theory and social practice: Cultural-historical approaches (pp. 
225-234). Aarhus: Aarhus University Press. 
Burman, E. (1994). Deconstructing developmental psychology. Routledge: London. 
Cohen, L. & Ambrose, D. (1999). Adaptation and Creativity. In M. Runco & S. Pritzker 
(Eds.), Encyclopedia of creativity, vol 1 (pp. 9-22). San Diego: Academic Press. 
Corsaro, W.A. & Eder, D. (1990). Children’s peer cultures. Annual Review of Sociology, 
16, 197-220. 
Craft, A. (2001). ‘Little c creativity’. In A. Craft, B. Jeffery & M. Leibling (Eds.), Creativity in 
education (pp. 45-61). London: Continuum. 
Craft, A. (2002). Creativity across the primary curriculum: Framing and developing 
practice. London: Routledge.  
Craft, A. (2005). Creativity in schools: Tensions and dilemmas. London: Routledge. 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1988). Society, culture, and person: a systems view of creativity. In 
R. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity: Contemporary psychological 
perspectives (pp. 325-339). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dacey, J. (1999). Concepts of creativity: A history. In M. Runco & S. Pritzker (Eds.), 
Encyclopedia of creativity, vol 1 (pp. 309-322). San Diego: Academic Press.  
 
18
D’Alessio, M. (1990). Social representations of childhood: An implicit theory of 
development. In G. Duveen & B. Lloyd (Eds.), Social representations and the 
development of knowledge (pp. 70-90). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Denzin, N.K. (1977). Childhood socialization. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.  
Dewey, J. (1934). Art as experience. New York: Penguin.  
Dudek, S.Z. (1973). Creativity in young children – attitude or ability. Paper presented at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Assn. (81st, Montreal, August 
27-31, 1973). 
Engel, S. (1993). Children’s bursts of creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 6(3), 309-318. 
Feldhusen, J.F. (2002). Creativity: The knowledge base and children. High Ability Studies, 
13(2), 179-183. 
Feldman, D.H. (1994). Beyond universals in cognitive development, second edition. 
Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation.  
Freud, S. (1908/1970). Creative writers and day-dreaming. In P.E. Vernon (Ed.), 
Creativity: Selected readings (pp.126-136). Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
Gardner, H. (1982). Art, mind, and brain: A cognitive approach to creativity. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Gardner, H. (1993). Creating minds. New York: Basic Books. 
Glăveanu, V.P. (2010a). Paradigms in the study of creativity: Introducing the 
perspective of cultural psychology. New Ideas in Psychology, 28(1), 79-93. 
Glăveanu, V.P. (2010b). Creativity as cultural participation. Journal for the Theory of 
Social Behaviour, no. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5914.2010.00445.x 
Gruber, H. & Wallace, D. (1999). The case study method and evolving systems 
approach for understanding unique creative people at work. In R. Sternberg 
(Ed.), Handbook of Creativity (pp. 93-115). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Jeffrey, B. & Craft, A. (2001). Introduction: The universalization of creativity. In A. Craft, B. 
Jeffery & M. Leibling (Eds.), Creativity in education (pp. 1-16). London: 
Continuum. 
Kennedy, D. (2006). Changing conceptions of the child from the Renaissance to post-
modernity: A philosophy of childhood. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press. 
Kennedy, D. (2008). Representing childhood: Image, narrative, theory and practice. 
Paper presented at the 4th Global Conference Creative Engagements: Thinking 
with Children.  
Kuczynski, L. & Navara, G. (2006). Sources of change in theories of socialization, 
internalization and acculturation . In M. Killen & J. Smetana (Eds), Handbook of 
Moral Development (pp. 299-327). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Kuczynski, L. & Parkin, C.M. (2007). Agency and bidirectionality in socialization: 
Interactions, transactions, and relational dialectics. In Grusec, J.E. & P.D. Hastings 
(Eds.), Handbook of socialization: Theory and research (pp. 259-283). New York: 
The Guilford Press. 
 
19
Lawrence, J.A. & Valsiner, J. (2003). Making personal sense: An account of basic 
internalization and externalization processes. Theory & Psychology, 13(6), 723-
752. 
Lynton, N. (1975). Klee. New York: Castle Books.  
Maccoby, E.E. (1992). The role of parents in the socialization of children: An historical 
overview. Developmental Psychology, 28(6), 1006-1007. 
Mason, J.H. (2003). The value of creativity: an essay on intellectual history, from Genesis 
to Nietzsche. Hampshire: Ashgate. 
Pascal, B. (2008). Pascal’s pensées. Middlesex: Echo Library.  
Prout, A. & James, A. (1997). A new paradigm for the sociology of childhood? 
Provenance, promise and problems. In A. James & A. Prout (Eds), Constructing 
and reconstructing childhood (pp. 7-33), 2nd edition. London: Falmer. 
Rhodes, M. (1961/1987). An analysis of creativity. In S.G. Isaksen (Ed.), Frontiers of 
creativity research: Beyond the basics (pp. 216–22). Buffalo, NY: Bearly. 
Runco, M. (2007). Creativity. Theories and themes: Research, development, and 
practice. Burlington, MA: Elsevier Academic Press. 
Sawyer, R.K. (1997). Introduction. In R.K. Sawyer (Ed.), Creativity in performance (pp. 1-
6). Greenwich, Connecticut: Ablex Publishing Corporation. 
Sawyer, R.K. (2000). Improvisation and the creative process: Dewey, Collingwood, and 
the aesthetics of spontaneity. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 58(2), 
149-161. 
Sawyer, R.K. et al. (2003). Key Issues in Creativity and Development. Prepared by all 
authors. In R.K. Sawyer et al. (Eds.), Creativity and Development. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp.217-242.  
Sefton-Green, J. (2000). From creativity to cultural production: Shared perspectives. In J. 
Sefton-Green & R. Sinker (Eds.), Evaluating creativity: Making and learning by 
young people (pp. 216-231). London: Routledge. 
Shaw, I. (1996). Unbroken voices: Children, young people and qualitative methods. In I. 
Butler & I. Shaw (Eds.), A case of neglect? Children’s experiences and the 
sociology of childhood (pp. 19-36). Aldershot: Avebury. 
Smolucha, F. (1992). A reconstruction of Vygotsky’s theory of creativity. Creativity 
Research Journal, 5(1), 49-67.  
Sommerville, C.J. (1982). The rise and fall of childhood. New York: Vintage Books. 
Stein, M. (1953). Creativity and culture. Journal of Psychology, 36, pp.311-322. 
Sternberg, R. & Lubart, T. (1999). The concept of creativity: Prospects and paradigms. In 
R. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of creativity (pp. 3-15). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Valentine, G. (2004). Public spaces and the culture of childhood. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Valsiner, J. (1997). Culture and the development of children’s action: A theory of 
human development. Second edition. New York: John Wiley.  
 
20
 
21
Vygotsky, L. (1987). Problems of general psychology. The Collected Works of L.S. 
Vygotsky, vol. 1, edited by R. Rieber and A. Carton. New York: Plenum Press. 
Vygotsky, L.S. (2004). The essential Vygotsky. Edited by R.W. Rieber and D.K. Robinson. 
New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. 
Wegerif, R. (2010). Mind expanding: Teaching for thinking and creativity in primary 
education. Berkshire: Open University Press. 
Weiner, R.P. (2000). Creativity and beyond: Cultures, Values, and Change. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
Weisberg, R. (1993). Creativity: Beyond the myth of the genius. New York: W.H. Freeman 
and Company.    
Weisberg, R. (1999). Creativity and knowledge: A challenge to theories. In R. Sternberg 
(Ed.), Handbook of creativity (pp. 226-250). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Willis, P. (1990). Common culture: Symbolic work at play in the everyday cultures of the 
young. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
